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Abstract
Operating leverage describes the extent to which a rms operating costs are
xed in the short run. The e¤ect of operating leverage is to amplify the impact
on prot of a change in revenues; an e¤ect which is further amplied by nancial
leverage and by asymmetry in the tax system. In this paper we provide empirical
estimates of operating leverage at the rm level, using a long panel of data on
UK quoted rms. We report sectoral di¤erences in operating leverage around the
business cycle, and show that these can be partly explained in terms of costly labour
adjustment and asymmetric price adjustment.
JEL Classication: E32, D4, G30.
Keywords: operating margin, panel data, xed and exible costs, business cycles.
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1 Introduction
Operating leverage describes the extent to which a rms operating costs are xed in the
short run. If the rm cannot, or chooses not to, fully adjust costs when revenues change,
this is directly observable in operating prot margins. The operating leverage e¤ect
of a change in revenues on earnings is amplied by underlying business risk, nancial
leverage and by asymmetry in the tax system (Hamada (1972), Rubinstein (1973), Lev
(1974), Bowman (1979), Mandelker and Rhee (1984), Mensah (1992)). Hence, operating
leverage lies at the heart of the distinction between cyclical and non-cyclical rms in
nancial markets.
One reason for the concern with operating leverage in the nance literature is its
potential to explain the value premium; the observation that value stocks with high
book-to-market ratios earn higher returns than growth stocks (Carlson et al. (2004),
Zhang (2005) and Cooper (2006)). Value rms earn higher returns because they largely
use assets in place that are riskier than growth options because of operating leverage;
without operating leverage growth options are riskier than assets in place (Lev, 1974;
Novy-Marx, 2011), so the value premium reects the rms investment behaviour (Fama
and French, 1996; Chen and Zhang, 1998; Berk et al., 1999). In Fama and French (1996)
the value premium compensates for nancial distress risk, with potentially negative e¤ects
on intangible elements of wealth such as human capital.
Garc¬a-Feijoo and Jorgensen (2010) report that the book-to-market ratio, beta, and
average stock returns are all positively associated with the degree of operating leverage in
the cross-section. In Gulen et al. (2008) value rms have higher operating leverage, higher
xed to total asset ratios, greater frequency of disinvestment, and higher nancial leverage
than growth rms, and are less exible than growth rms in adjusting to worsening
economic conditions. Other empirical studies that support a risk explanation of the
value premium include Mandelker and Rhee (1984), Lord (1996), Ho et al. (2004) and
Novy-Marx (2007). Novy-Marx1 nds that the book to market ratio explains returns
within an industry, though not between industries (also Zhang (2005) and Aguerrevere
(2006)).
Survey-based evidence in industrial economics has suggested an asymmetric response
to a shock to sales, with quantity adjustments more likely in recessions than in booms
(Machin et al. (1993)). Liquidity constrained rms are less likely to cut prices (Gottfries
(1991)), implying that additional liquidity may be more important in recessions that are
driven by demand shocks. Liquidity constraints and limited access to capital markets
may explain the greater procyclicity of small rms, which therefore bear the brunt of
monetary policy shocks (Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)).
Though prot margins are observably procyclical (Green and Porter (1984); Machin
1Unconventionally, in Novy-Marx (2007) operating leverageis the prot margin while the variation
in that margin due to sticky costs is termed degree of operational inexibility(also, Gourio (2005)). He
says: While higher variable costs result in e¤ectively more levered assets, they should also be associated
with more exibility on the cost side. When capital costs are small relative to ow costs associated
with production, rms should be more willing to shut down unprotable production, even if it entails the
loss of capital. . . . Operating leverage is, to rst-order approximation, the inverse of a rms operating
margins, and thus it is generally closer to ten than zero . . . In response to negative shocks rmsrevenues
typically fall more quickly than they can reduce costs; prices are more responsive than rmsoperations.
. . . While simple theory suggests that expected returns should be increasing in operating leverage, the fact
that they should also be increasing in operational inexibility, which is di¢ cult to observe and negatively
correlated with the level of operating leverage, makes direct inference on the expected return/operating
leverage relationship di¢ cult.
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and van Reenen (1993)), it has proven hard to extract measures of operating leverage
from the observed behaviour of prot margins. For some raw materials, supply may
be rapidly adjustable and reversible at little cost. Highly specic plant and equipment
may be hard to sell and di¢ cult to reacquire; it may trade in illiquid markets with
a wide spread between disposal value and replacement cost. Campello and Giambona
(2013) and James and Kizilaslan (2014) argue that only those tangible assets that can be
easily redeployed can sustain debt capacity. In this way, operating leverage and nancial
leverage may be natural substitutes. In Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2013) rms
with high asset betas hold more cash and have a higher cost of debt nancing.
The adjustment of physical capital and human capital go hand-in-hand as they are
the two key dimensions of capacity. Skilled labour has the character of specic industrial
plant. Employment law and labour contracting create lags in the adjustment of labour
inputs so that, on the downside, a labour-cost response may be observed signicantly
later than a fall in revenue. On the upside, labour may be costly to acquire or reacquire
and can take both time and expenditure to equip it with organization specic knowledge.
As with specic intangible assets, the replacement cost of skilled labour is likely to move
procyclically.For labour cost, rms disclose both employment and wage but, otherwise,
the price and quantity components of cost and revenue are not observable in panel data.
One thing that makes operating leverage empirically elusive is the role of expectations
where there are asymmetric adjustment costs to increasing and reducing capacity. If a
rm or an industry is undergoing secular growth or contraction that is fully anticipated
then capacity can be adjusted and even xed assets, physical capital, can be bought or
sold in a timely way. In practice, rms may be slow to recognise secular growth or decline
or slow to respond to it, especially if they are uncertain whether it will be temporary
or permanent. If the rm faces what it believes to be a cyclical change in demand and
if adjustment is costly then it may be rational to maintain unused capacity through the
cycle. At an inection point, rms may be unclear whether a change in revenues is secular
or cyclical and how long the cycle will last.
We have the following testable predictions:
 We predict that small rms experience greater costs of adjusting capacity and,
assuming size proxies nancial strength, large rms are better able to bear the
costs of non-adjustment. We measure size both in terms of employment and the
quantity of xed capital.
 We predict that adjustment costs may be asymmetric, so that rms exhibit higher
operating leverage, that is the non-adjustment of capacity leading to relatively
depressed margins, in cyclical downturns than in upturns.
 Asymmetric response of costs may also reect price adjustments over the economic
cycle, rather than quantity adjustments, where such adjustments are subject to
nominal rigidities (Machin et al. (1993)).
 Since the costs of adjusting capacity are likely to reect the nature of the inputs,
we expect to see systematic di¤erences in cyclicity between sectors.
We estimate a model of operating leverage by applying panel data methods to data
on UK quoted rms from 1968 to 2011. Much of the data displays temporal non-
stationarity and potentially strong dependence cross-sectionally (Petersen (2009)). This
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cross-sectional dependence is related to factor structure that needs to be modelled explic-
itly (Fama and French (1992, 1996); Gri¢ n (2002)). We address these issues as follows.
To allow for nonstationarity of our main activity measures, sales and costs at the
rm-level (in logarithms), we model the relationship between costs and sales (operating
leverage) as a dynamic, non-stationary process. We allow that sales and costs may
be in long-run equilibrium so that, at the rm-level, logarithms of sales and costs are
potentially cointegrated. The short-run and long-run dynamics between costs and sales
is modelled as an error correction process in which the underlying series are non-stationary
and potentially cointegrating. Cross-section dependence is modelled using the common
correlated e¤ects approach of Pesaran (2006), which allows for potential factor-based
strong dependence. This powerful framework allows us the determine how operating
leverage reacts, in the short run, to variations in the use of capital and employment, and
also the extent to which there is asymmetric adjustment.
In section 2 we describe the data. In section 3 we develop and estimate a model of
operating leverage and in section 4 we draw conclusions.
2 Data and descriptives
The data are drawn from the LBS/Cambridge accounting data set, which is an archive
of annual company balance sheet and income statement data for all UK industrial and
commercial quoted companies. In terms of coverage, the dataset attempts to be complete
in companies listed on a UK exchange, principally the London Stock Exchange and also
the junior markets including USM (Unlisted Securities Market) and AIM (Alternative
Investments Market). We include industrial and commercial companies, but exclude
nancial and property companies. There is substantial attrition in the population of
listed rms as rms exit through acquisition or failure, and enter through stock exchange
listing. Hence, the panel is unbalanced but large. The dataset contains between 1500
and 2000 companies per annum. Since UK companies were required to disclose sales for
the rst time in 1967, 1968 is the rst year with a measure of sales growth. The sectoral
composition is described in Table 1 (top panel: 1968 to 1989; bottom panel: 1990 to
2010).
Certain features of rm panel data add measurement error and confound our ability
to interpret the results. Some companies are exporters and some are multinational in
operation so that their data includes the results of foreign operations, reducing the po-
tential alignment between reported sales of these companies and domestic GDP. Equally,
foreign-owned domestic rms are missing from the data, although their output forms part
of domestic GDP. Data are drawn from annual nancial statements with heterogeneous
accounting year ends in this data 37% of companies have a December year-end; March,
22%; September, 10%; June, 8%. Our convention is to assign observations to the previous
calendar year when the nancial statement date is 19 May or before.
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11:pdf
Median Sales Growth (nominal and real) and GDP
deator.
Figure 1 plots the median growth rates in annual sales in nominal and real terms,
and the ination measure (GDP deator) used to deate the real series. The potentially
misleading nature of nominal sales growth rates in the high ination environment of the
1970s and early 1980s is evident. In 1975, the median nominal growth rate was 17 percent
but annual ination was in excess of 20 percent, and the median rms real growth rate
was minus 6 percent. From the 1990s on, nominal and real growth rates converge.
Figure 2 plots the 10th, 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the distribution of annual
company growth rates in real sales. A number of regularities are evident. For all of
these quantiles, the growth rate is highly cyclical. The highest growth rms (the 75th
percentile) display the most variance in growth rates around the cycle. Second, prior to
the mid-1980s, the interquartile range of growth rates is stable but from the mid-1980s,
the dispersion of growth rates signicantly increases.
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Table 1. Sector (1-; 2- digit) composition of the sample:
1a
2:pdf
1b
3:pdf
Third, in any year a signicant proportion of the corporate population do not grow
and have real sales that are either at or declining. Fourth, the median growth rate in
real sales is stationary throughout this 40 year period at only slightly above zero. Fifth,
negative real growth is the norm at the rst quartile. Real growth at this quantile is never
positive; even in boom periods it may reach but does not exceed the zero axis. Finally,
during the deepest downturn during this 40 year period, which was the 1980s recession,
even at the third quartile (75th percentile) growth of zero. At that time, 75 percent of
rms experienced negative real growth.
Table 2 reports median annual real sales growth rates by one-digit and two-digit
industry sectors. For reference the table also reports the percentage annual change in
real GDP (O¢ ce of National Statistics (ONS) data series IHYP). We want to observe
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Figure 1: Distribution of company growth rates (selected percentiles)
how individual company fundamentals (sales, costs, prots) move around the business
cycle. Using sales as the measure of a rms activity and aggregate GDP to proxy the
average response, we examine the dynamics of activity, taking into account heterogeneity
across sectors in their relation to the aggregate cycle. We expect to nd that sectors
may lag or lead the aggregate economy in the response to a downturn, and may display
a greater or smaller response, or in some cases no response at all.
Table 2 ags recessionary years, that is, calendar years experiencing negative growth
rate in aggregate GDP. Although there is substantial alignment between sector sales
growth and change in aggregate GDP, the disaggregate analysis points to variations in
the experience of rms during di¤erent episodes of downturn. For example, the deep
1980-1981 recession in the observed in aggregate data was also associated with declining
real sales in almost all sectors. However, most sectors also reported negative sales growth
in 1979 and in 5 of 18 sectors there was a fourth year of negative sales growth in 1982.
There was a similar, though less intense, pattern around the 1991 downturn, with 6 sectors
reporting sales downturn in 1990. The recession that followed the recent nancial crisis is
often described as the deepest in living memory. The 2009 recession was uniquely sharp
in terms of the decline in GDP. But for the industrialeconomy that we are examining in
this paper, with the notable exception of construction the impact of recession was both
smaller, and less consistent across sectors, than in the 1980-1981 downturn. Table 1b also
ags the quasi recessionaryyear, 2002. In terms of the impact on median sales growth
this was a worse year than 2009 in many sectors. However this is not equally reected in
aggregate GDP.
Figure 3 plots the median return on capital employed (prot/capital employed), where
capital employed is the sum of equity shareholders funds and long- plus short-term
borrowing less cash. Prot is earnings before interest and tax, depreciation, amortisation
and impairment, and exceptional items. For comparison, the dotted line in Figure 3 is
the median real sales growth series from Figure 1. It is clear that most, though not all,
of the time series variation (cyclicity) in real sales growth is reected in return on capital
employed.
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Table 2. Cyclicity of company growth at the sector level:
2a
5:pdf
2b
6:pdf
Figure 3 then decomposes the return on capital employed into its prot margin
(prot/sales) and asset utilisation (sales/capital employed, right hand axis) components.
Apparently, most of the variation in return on capital employed is coming from sales.
Prot margins are procyclical, but prot margins display a dampened response to shocks
to sales, suggesting that there is some pass through to costs. At the same time, the pass-
through is not perfect, otherwise prot margins would not exhibit the cyclical pattern
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Figure 2: Components of returns, 1968 2010.
observed in the data.
Table 3. Eect of the cycle on the median margin at the sector level:
3a
8:pdf
3b
9:pdf
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Table 3 reports the median annual prot margin by (1 digit and 2 digit) sector.
Broadly, the data display some compression in prot margins in economic downturns,
however the story is a complex one. Some industries, for example oil and gas, displayed
temporal patterns in margins that are apparently unconnected to the aggregate business
cycle, while margins in other industries appear to have responded more strongly to some
downturns than to others.
Geroski and Gregg (1998) focused on two major UK recessions, which they dated
1980-1981 and 1990-1991. They concluded that the recession caused a sea change in
prot margins that, having fallen in recession, never fully recovered. Inspection of Table
3 o¤ers some limited evidence of this. At least in some sectors, the fall in margin persisted
for a number of years beyond the recessionaryperiod.
The sector medians reported in Table 3 need to be interpreted with caution. As seen
in Table 1, some of these sectors are thinly populated in some years, so that the medians
are maybe unrepresentative. For instance, although the automobile industry accounts
for a signicant proportion of UK GDP, since 1990 the major UK automobile companies
(assemblers) are foreign-owned and are thus missing from our data.
3 A basic model of operating leverage
In the corporate nance literature, papers (for example, Ang and Peterson (1984); DeY-
oung and Roland (2001); Gri¢ n and Dugan (2003); Ho et al. (2004)) commonly employ
some variant of the approach in Mandelker and Rhee (1984), who estimate the degree of
operating leverage, DOL, as the slope coe¢ cient in a time-series regression of prot, or
costs, on sales. Other researchers proxy operating leverage as a nancial ratio such as the
ratio of xed assets to total assets (Ferri and Jones, (1979); Lord (1998)). In Novy-Marx
(2007) operating leverageis the prot margin while the variation in that margin due
to sticky costs is termed degree of operational inexibility(also Gourio (2005))2. This
approach, that uses average prot margin as a proxy for operating leverage can at best
only indirectly capture the notion of operating leverage, as it is popularily used, and in
its role as a risk factor in theories of the risk premium. That is a story about changes
in margin in response to a shock to sales and about the determinants of the stickiness in
costs. Studies that regress the logarithm of operating costs on the logarithm of sales and
use the coe¢ cient on sales to measure operating leverage come closer to examining the
issues (Lev (1974) is an early example and Kahl et al. (2013) a recent one.
Machin and van Reenen (1993) regress the change in prot margin on the business
cycle, proxied by the unemployment rate, allowing for rm-level controls and dynamics.
Their sample is larger UK rms over the 1970s and 1980s, covering one major recession
- the early 1980s. They nd that the prot margin is stationary and cyclical. Margins
2He says: While higher variable costs result in e¤ectively more levered assets, they should also be
associated with more exibility on the cost side. When capital costs are small relative to ow costs
associated with production, rms should be more willing to shut down unprotable production, even if
it entails the loss of capital. . . . Operating leverage is, to rst-order approximation, the inverse of a
rms operating margins, and thus it is generally closer to ten than zero . . . In response to negative
shocks rmsrevenues typically fall more quickly than they can reduce costs; prices are more responsive
than rms operations. . . . While simple theory suggests that expected returns should be increasing in
operating leverage, the fact that they should also be increasing in operational inexibility, which is di¢ cult
to observe and negatively correlated with the level of operating leverage, makes direct inference on the
expected return/operating leverage relationship di¢ cult.
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decline sharply in recessions, though the timing of the impact of aggregate shocks appears
to di¤er across sectors.
We draw upon a number of recent developments in panel data and spatial econometrics
to estimate a panel error correction model. We rst estimate the model using conventional
panel methods where slopes are homogeneous and possible cross sectional correlation is
ignored. Next, we model potential heterogeneity caused by slope coe¢ cients varying
across rms using the mean group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995). This method
involves rst separately estimating a time series error correction model for each cross
section unit. Next, under the assumption of random slope coe¢ cients (Swamy (1970)),
the mean slope is estimated as the average of these cross-section specic slope estimates;
the standard error is also estimated in a similar way. If a test that the slope estimates for
the long run e¤ect are actually the same across rms is not rejected, we use the pooled
mean group estimator (Pesaran et al., 1999).
To allow for nonstationarity of our main activity measures, sales and costs at the
rm-level (in logarithms), we model the relationship between costs and sales (operating
leverage) as a dynamic, non-stationary process. In doing so, we admit the possibility
that sales and costs may be in long-run equilibrium. In other words, at the rm-level,
logarithms of sales and costs are potentially cointegrated. Importantly, this framework
allows us the determine how operating leverage reacts, in the short run, to variations in
the use of capital and employment, and also the extent to which there is asymmetric ad-
justment. The short-run and long-run dynamics between costs and sales is modelled as an
error correction process in which the underlying series are non-stationary and potentially
cointegrating. Cross-section dependence is modelled using the common correlated e¤ects
approach of Pesaran (2006), which allows for potential factor-based strong dependence.
The rst model we work with is a xed e¤ects panel error correction model with
homogeneous slopes,
 ln cit = i +  ln sit    (ln ci;t 1    ln si;t 1) + "it; i = 1; N; t = 1; T: (1)
Here cit and sit denote the costs and sales of rm i in year t. The form of the model
allows us to treat the determination of the change in margin,  ln(cit=sit), simultane-
ously with the margin itself, ln(cit=sit). The model includes rm-specic xed e¤ects i
capturing unobserved rm-level heterogeneity, including the hazard rates (Mills ratio) of
attrition from the sample. Hence, potential sample selection bias is accounted for. The
relationship between costs and sales includes partial adjustment () to a hypothesized
long run equilibrium relationship between log-costs and log-sales, the e¤ect of sales on
costs in long-run equilibrium (), and the short-run dynamic e¤ect of sales on costs ().
Specied this way, if   1, (ln cit   i ln sit)  ln (1  it), where it denotes the
prot margin of rm i in year t. We test the stationarity of ln (1  it), and test for a
homogeneous long run equilibrium, implying that i = ; with, in the limit,  = 1. In such
an equilibrium, the value of ln (1  it) is  i=i and the rm would anticipate partial
adjustment of  (ln ci;t 1    ln si;t 1) to this equilibrium.
The short-run rm-specic slope coe¢ cient  captures the e¤ect of a shock to sales 
our estimate of operating leverage. If a rm can pass a shock to sales completely through
to costs, margin stays unchanged, so  = 1. If pass-through is incomplete, E () < 1.
We test H0 : E () = 1 against the left-tailed alternative H1 : E () < 1. We start with
an analysis of the basic statistical properties of our rm-level data.
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3.1 Stationarity and cointegration
We have a large, very unbalanced data set so the power of the tests for panel unit roots
can have low power when the number of observations are small. Table 4 reports panel
unit root tests for a more limited set using the Im-Pesaran-Shin test (Im et al., 2003),
when there are at least 20 and 30 complete observations for each rm. Heterogeneity
across rms in the slope (autoregressive parameter) is allowed. The null hypothesis is
that all rms have unit roots against the alternative that a nite proportion of rms have
stationary sales (or costs).
Table 4: Panel Unit Root Tests
Observations >20 >30
Firms 849 373
Average years 30.5 37.4
lnCosts 0.380y 0.941y
lnSales 0.025y 0.436y
lnCosts 0.000y 0.000y
lnSales 0.000y 0.000y
y p-values
The null that all rms in the panel have unit roots for both real sales and real costs (in
logarithms) is not rejected at the 1% level. However, the unit root hypothesis is rejected
for growth in real sales and real costs. Thus,
ln sit; ln cit  I(1);
where sit and cit denote real sales and real costs respectively, for rm i in year t.
Given that sales and costs have unit roots the next question is whether sales and costs
are cointegrated and that there is a proportionate relationship between costs and sales,
so that the prot margin in the long run is stationary. An indirect test of cointegration
(Stock, 1987 and Stock and Watson, 1993) is whether the non-stationary terms in the log
of sales and costs are statistically signicant in a regression of the (stationary) change in
the log of costs. This test is reported in Table 5. In all cases both terms are signicantly
di¤erent from zero. A joint test for whether the two coe¢ cients are zero ( =  = 0) is
also rejected.
The coe¢ cient on  ln sit in Table 5 provides a measure of whether a shock to sales
produces a proportionate change in costs. Depending upon the sample size this varies
from 68 percent to 85 percent. A test for the null restriction that lncostst 1 lnsalest 1 =
0 ( =  ) is also rejected. This suggests that when we assume both homogeneous
slopes and cross sectional independence, prot margins are non-stationary. At the same
time, unit root tests indicate that prot margins are stationary. Together, this points to
substantial heterogeneity across rms, so that the slope homogeneity assumption may be
somewhat misplaced.
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Table 5: Tests for Cointegration
Response:  lncostst Pooled Panel, FE Panel, FE Panel, FE Panel, FE
Included rms all all >10 years >20 years >30 years
 lnsalest 0.676*** 0.698*** 0.777*** 0.857*** 0.851***
(0.00206) (0.00211) (0.00225) (0.00231) (0.00231)
lncostst 1 -0.212*** -0.500*** -0.452*** -0.417*** -0.4635***
(0.00223) (0.00359) (0.00388) (0.00492) (0.00718)
lnsalest 1 0.191*** 0.438*** 0.415*** 0.405*** 0.4546***
(0.00207) (0.00337) (0.00370) (0.00484) (0.00707)
Constant 0.157*** 0.425*** 0.244*** 0.0644*** 0.0364***
(0.00345) (0.00858) (0.00804) (0.00702) (0.00755)
Observations 55,330 55,330 42,931 24998 13571
R-squared 0.674 0.719 0.767 0.860 0.890
Number of rms 4,901 4,901 2,147 849 373
Joint Test: p-values
lncostst 1 =lnsalest 1 = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
lncostst 1 lnsalest 1 = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel, FE: xed e¤ects regression; Pooled: pooled OLS
4 Slope Heterogeneity and Mean Group Estimators
An assumption in the previous section is that the estimates of the slopes in the model
are constant across rms. We now relax the assumption of constant slopes and report
mean group estimates of the slopes in equation (1). Our basic model is now a panel error
correction model with heterogeneous slopes,
 ln cit = i + i ln sit   i (ln ci;t 1   i ln si;t 1) + "it; i = 1; N; t = 1; T: (2)
In other words we estimate the model for each rm and then take the average of the slopes
(Pesaran and Smith, 1995). In the panel error correction model (1), an assumption is
sometimes made that the long run e¤ect is homogeneous across rms (i = ), while the
short run e¤ect and partial adjustment is potentially heterogeneous. The pooled mean
group estimator (Pesaran et al., 1999) can then be used. The mean group and pooled
mean group estimates are shown in Tables 6a and 6b for di¤erent numbers of observations
for each rm.
The short run e¤ects - estimates of the coe¢ cients on sales growth ( lnsales), as a
measure of operating leverage - are now around 94 to 95 percent. This is much larger and
closer to unity than the homogeneous slope estimates in Table 5. However, the di¤erence
from unity, E (i) = 1, is statistically signicant in a one tailed test, suggesting that
there is substantial operating leverage. In response to a shock to sales, on average, costs
are adjusted by 94 percent within the same year.
Together, there is evidence of a cointegrating long term equilibrium relationship be-
tween logarithm of costs and sales. The partial adjustment in one year to this long-run
equilibrium is estimated by the mean group estimator at around 42-47 percent. The
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pooled mean group estimates are statistically signicantly di¤erent. This is not unex-
pected, since the assumption of a common long run sales-cost equilibrium across all rms
in all the sectors may be too strong. A Hausman test (Hausman (1978)) rejects, at the
1% level, the null hypothesis of a homogenous long-run coe¢ cient across all rms. This
may be di¤erent when we conduct sectoral analyses later in the paper. Firms within a
specic sector may well have in equilibrium a common sector-specic prot margin.
Table 6: Mean Group and Pooled Mean Group Estimators
6a) Firm observations>20 Mean Group Pooled Mean Group
Response:  lncostst error correction short run error correction short run
Regressors
Partial adj., : Ecmt 1 -0.466*** -0.392***
(0.00928) (0.00916)
 lnsales 0.938*** 0.936***
(0.00435) (0.00418)
lnsalest 1 1.064*** 1.005***
(0.0404) (0.000536)
Constant -0.0507*** -0.0386***
(0.0121) (0.00151)
Observations 24,998 24,998 24,998 24,998
p-value
lnsalest 1 = 1 0.111 0.000
6b) Firm Observations>30 Mean Group Pooled Mean Group
Response:  lnCostst error correction short run error correction short run
Regressors
Partial adj., : Ecmt 1 -0.418*** -0.353***
(0.0119) (0.0115)
 lnsales 0.952*** 0.952***
(0.00543) (0.00536)
lnsalest 1 1.014*** 1.001***
(0.00686) (0.000756)
Constant -0.0372*** -0.0280***
(0.0112) (0.00131)
Observations 13,571 13,571 13,571 13,571
p-values
lnsalest 1 = 1 0.0431 0.0539
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5 Cross Section Dependence
Thus far we have reported results for both homogeneous and heterogeneous slopes. How-
ever, the recent literature on large panels has highlighted the need to test for cross-
sectional strong dependence generated by latent (or unobservable) factors with loadings
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that are heterogeneous across rms. These latent factors may generate strong cross sec-
tion dependence among rms and, if omitted from the model, may invalidate inferences
from panel data models. To proxy the e¤ect of potentially multiple latent factors, the
common correlated e¤ects (CCE) method (Pesaran, 2006; Holly et al., 2011; Bailey et
al., 2013) includes cross section averages of the dependent and independent variables as
additional regressors.3
Strong cross-sectional dependence comes from factors that a¤ect all cross section units,
though by di¤ering amounts. An example is macroeconomic developments - if we expand
the number of cross section units, even as N ! 1, then all rms are still a¤ected by
macroeconomic developments. Weak cross-sectional dependence is more localised. Firms
may be correlated because they belong to the same industry which is subject to some
common technological developments, because they belong to the same regional (spatial)
area which is subject to local shocks, or through supply or demand side linkages.
Table 7: CD Test for Cross Section Dependence
Observations >30
Firms 373
Average years 37.4
Fixed E¤ects 46.58 (0.000)y
Mean Group 175.1 (0.000)y
CCE 171.4 (0.000)y
y p-values
Table 7 reports tests for strong cross-sectional dependence, for which we use the CD
test (Pesaran, 2013). There is signicant evidence of cross-sectional strong dependence.
We account for this by following the common correlated e¤ects methodology, where cross-
section averages of the explanatory variables are included in the estimated model. Cross
sectional averages are included in the short run dynamics and cross section averages of
ln ci;t 1 and ln si;t 1 in the long run part of the model. We approximate these cross
sectional averages by logarithms of average costs and sales, ln ct 1 and ln st 1, calculated
across all rms4 .
In Table 8 we report results for the heterogeneous case using the common correlated
e¤ects estimator with group mean estimates. Two cases are distinguished. The mean
group estimator in the left hand side of the table reports cross sectional averages of all
of the parameters in equation (1). The pooled mean group estimates in the right hand
side of the table still take the cross sectional averages of the estimates of  lnsalest (and
in general any estimates of the short run part of the equation) but the coe¢ cients on the
long run part, impose (and test for) a common set of coe¢ cients.
3It should be noted that we do not use the common correlated e¤ects approach with homogeneous
panels because in this case this would be equivalent to including time e¤ects.
4In other words, we take ln ct 1 = ln
 
n 1
Pn
i=1 ci;t 1

as an approximation for n 1
Pn
i=1 ln ci;t 1.
The justication goes as follows. Let sit = cit= (nct) denote the (total costs) market share of rm i
in year t, and let si denote a hypothesized equilibrium (or average) market share for rm i, dened by
si = E (sit). Then, ln cit = ln (nsitct) = lnn+ln ct+ln [s

i + (sit   si )]  lnn+ln ct+ln si+(sit   si ) =si ,
by rst order Taylor approximation, which holds when sit is close to its equilibrium value, that is (sit   si )
is small. Further, E (sit=si ) = 1 ) E
h
sit si
si
i
= 0, and hence as n ! 1; n 1Pni=1 (sit   si ) =si ! 0
almost surely. Hence, n 1
Pn
i=1 ln cit  lnn+ ln ct + n 1
Pn
i=1 (sit   si ) =si , which converges to ln ct as
n!1. Likewise, ln st 1 = ln
 
n 1
Pn
i=1 si;t 1

is an approximation to n 1
Pn
i=1 ln si;t 1.
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As with the results in Table 5 the estimates of operating leverage with constant slopes
suggests that rms adjust costs much more slowly in response to a shock to sales. By
contrast when the mean group estimator is used with common correlated e¤ects, as in
Table 8, the partial adjustment to the cost-sales equilibrium is again much quicker.
Table 8: Common Correlated E¤ects with Heterogeneity
8a) Firm observations>20 Mean Group Pooled Mean Group
Response:  lncostst error correction short run error correction short run
Regressors
Partial adj., : Ecmt 1 -0.424*** -0.350***
(0.00998) (0.00937)
 lnsalest 0.949*** 0.947***
(0.00426) (0.00407)
lnsalest 1 1.017*** 1.009***
(0.0146) (0.000738)
Constant -0.0499*** -0.0388***
(0.00824) (0.00156)
Observations 24,998 24,998 24,998 24,998
p-values
lnsalest 1 = 1 0.235 0.000
8b) Firm observations>30 Mean Group Pooled Mean Group
Response:  lncostst error correction short run error correction short run
Regressors
Partial adj., : Ecmt 1 -0.409*** -0.341***
(0.0122) (0.0118)
 lnsales 0.958*** 0.959***
(0.00512) (0.00504)
lnsalest 1 1.013*** 0.996***
(0.0261) (0.00106)
Constant -0.0140** 0.00593***
(0.00696) (0.00111)
Observations 13,571 13,571 13,571 13,571
p-values
lnsalest 1 = 1 0.622 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Nevertheless, it is also clear that the use of the CCE approach does not actually
eliminate cross sectional dependence when we use the cross section across all rms. It
appears that the common factors lie less with averages across rms and more with sector-
specic factors.5
5In an analysis of house price dynamics across urban areas in the US, Bailey et al. (2013) nd
that once regional cross-section averages are included, in addition to national averages, cross-section
dependence can be made weak enough to proceed with spatial modeling.
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6 Sectoral E¤ects on Operating Margin
The results in the previous section suggest that to eliminate the possible presence of
strong cross section dependence we need to look more closely at the sectoral level. In
Table 9 we report mean group estimates for sectors, again allowing for heterogeneous
slopes. We nd now that our estimates of operating margin vary across sectors with
most sectors above 90% but with mining at 83% and Automobiles at 84%. One outlier
is Beveridges, with an operating margin at 104%.
Table 9: Sector Mean Group Estimates with Heterogeneity
Dependent Variable:costst
Sector constant lnsalest lncostst 1 lnsalest 1
Oil & Gas Producers 0.022076 0.90857 -0.48965 0.476073
(MG, years >10) -(0.209) -(0.055) -(0.053) -(0.055)
Chemicals -0.09991 0.93324 -0.52582 0.531384
(MG, years >32) -(0.069) -(0.019) -(0.047) -(0.047)
Forestry & Paper -0.10366 0.9146 -0.53993 0.55258
(MG, years >17) -(0.073) -(0.016) -(0.064) -(0.062)
Industrial Metals 0.031626 0.91747 -0.57009 0.559036
(MG, years >10) -(0.063) -(0.016) -(0.056) -(0.053)
Mining 0.027867 0.83094 -0.43195 0.424336
(MG, years >10) -(0.207) -(0.050) -(0.094) -(0.095)
Construction & Materials -0.04174 0.95941 -0.4232 0.423853
(MG, years >31) -(0.029) -(0.010) -(0.041) -(0.039)
Aerospace & Defense -0.00858 0.96147 -0.52653 0.521714
(MG, years >8) -(0.032) -(0.019) -(0.067) -(0.067)
General Industrials -0.07523 0.97265 -0.6418 0.644411
(MG, years >23) -(0.062) -(0.019) -(0.050) -(0.049)
Electronic & Electrical Equipment -0.08005 0.91339 -0.47163 0.477743
(MG, years >21) -(0.029) -(0.014) -(0.027) -(0.026)
Industrial Engineering -0.03209 0.95513 -0.48275 0.482819
(MG, years >37) -(0.031) -(0.011) -(0.033) -(0.032)
Industrial Transportation -0.23447 0.94004 -0.53256 0.559906
(MG, years >25) -(0.097) -(0.021) -(0.049) -(0.056)
Support Services -0.08068 0.97234 -0.41437 0.422153
(MG, years >30) -(0.018) -(0.009) -(0.037) -(0.037)
Automobiles & Parts -0.15654 0.84275 -0.52893 0.549875
(MG, years >11) -(0.128) -(0.086) -(0.067) -(0.077)
Beverages -0.02535 1.04193 -0.35401 0.346237
(MG, years >16) -(0.053) -(0.015) -(0.047) -(0.047)
Food Producers -0.1095 0.98123 -0.56362 0.577696
(MG, years >19) (0.127) (0.028) (0.054) (0.054)
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Table 9 continued: Sector Mean Group Estimates with Heterogeneity
Dependent Variable:costst
Sector constant lnsalest lncostst 1 lnsalest 1
Household Goods 0.050976 0.92049 -0.44078 0.428728
(MG, years >36) -(0.043) -(0.015) -(0.042) -(0.041)
leisure Goods -0.19495 0.90235 -0.49304 0.517244
(MG, years >14) -(0.120) -(0.025) -(0.060) -(0.061)
Personal Goods -0.00646 0.93423 -0.51442 0.510294
(MG, years >31) -(0.032) -(0.011) -(0.037) -(0.035)
Health Care Equip. & Services -0.14492 0.95097 -0.61781 0.632681
(MG, years >10) -(0.046) -(0.021) -(0.060) -(0.060)
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology -0.04 0.8977 -0.65084 0.664873
(MG, years >16) -(0.155) -(0.044) -(0.072) -(0.079)
Food & Drug retailers -0.0537 0.9863 -0.61156 0.617842
(MG, years >24) -(0.032) -(0.012) -(0.063) -(0.064)
General retailers 0.02606 0.93527 -0.48686 0.470425
(MG, years >30) -(0.059) -(0.015) -(0.043) -(0.045)
Media -0.03999 0.93773 -0.48339 0.483064
(MG, years >21) -(0.053) -(0.021) -(0.039) -(0.041)
Travel & leisure -0.02935 0.92203 -0.46887 0.467155
(MG, years >32) -(0.039) -(0.019) -(0.044) -(0.043)
Gas, Water & Multiutilities -0.23943 1.10378 -0.50946 0.519696
(MG, years >16) -(0.342) -(0.060) -(0.049) -(0.071)
Software & Computer Services -0.0179 0.88451 -0.60622 0.592866
(MG, years >14) -(0.102) -(0.036) -(0.054) -(0.055)
Technology Hardware & Equipment 0.137669 0.8516 -0.63956 0.612473
(MG, years >15) -(0.151) -(0.045) -(0.087) -(0.084)
In Table 10 we repeat the exercise but we now also allow for cross sectional dependence.
We nd that there is a general increase in our estimates of operating margin, as we found
at the aggregate level, but in some instances there is a fall.
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Table 10: Sector Common Correlated E¤ects with Heterogeneity
Dependent Variable: costst
Sector constant lnsalest lncostst 1 lnsalest 1
Oil & Gas Producers -0.1505 0.9619 -0.4588 0.4486
(CCE, years >10) (0.168) (0.035) (0.079) (0.088)
Chemicals -0.1088 0.9521 -0.7046 0.7180
(CCE, years >32) (0.146) (0.019) (0.040) (0.042)
Forestry & Paper 0.0631 0.9593 -0.8001 0.8600
(CCE, years >17) (0.148) (0.027) (0.098) (0.097)
Industrial Metals 0.0449 0.9500 -0.8945 0.8777
(CCE, years >10) (0.141) (0.019) (0.058) (0.061)
Mining -0.4414 0.9313 -0.5664 0.4161
(CCE, years >10) (1.414) (0.033) (0.194) (0.151)
Construction & Materials -0.1140 0.9759 -0.5843 0.5840
(CCE, years >31) (0.066) (0.011) (0.051) (0.049)
Aerospace & Defense 0.0836 0.9938 -0.7460 0.7323
(CCE, years >8) (0.213) (0.025) (0.108) (0.116)
General Industrials -0.0915 0.9861 -0.7296 0.7348
(CCE, years >23) (0.077) (0.012) (0.060) (0.059)
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 0.0373 0.9277 -0.6540 0.6611
(CCE, years >21) (0.078) (0.013) (0.035) (0.034)
Industrial Engineering -0.0506 0.9659 -0.5990 0.6041
(CCE, years >37) (0.057) (0.011) (0.041) (0.040)
Industrial Transportation -0.4916 0.9517 -0.6730 0.7207
(CCE, years >25) (0.233) (0.019) (0.053) (0.064)
Support Services -0.1819 0.9950 -0.5414 0.5550
(CCE, years >30) (0.065) (0.008) (0.042) (0.044)
Automobiles & Parts -0.0425 0.8553 -0.6313 0.6419
(CCE, years >11) (0.172) (0.085) (0.043) (0.049)
Beverages 0.0635 1.0344 -0.5152 0.5028
(CCE, years >16) (0.094) (0.017) (0.063) (0.066)
Food Producers -0.0308 0.9712 -0.6221 0.6156
(CCE, years >19) (0.127) (0.028) (0.054) (0.054)
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Table 10 continued: Sector Common Correlated E¤ects with Heterogeneity
Dependent Variable: costst
Sector constant lnsalest lncostst 1 lnsalest 1
Household Goods 0.1164 0.9478 -0.5818 0.5677
(CCE, years >36) (0.099) (0.014) (0.046) (0.046)
Leisure Goods 0.1842 0.9468 -0.8883 0.8948
(CCE, years >14) (0.165) (0.030) (0.095) (0.090)
Personal Goods -0.0610 0.9592 -0.7218 0.7272
(CCE, years >31) (0.054) (0.010) (0.038) (0.038)
Health Care Equip. & Services 0.2477 0.9588 -0.7654 0.7998
(CCE, years >10) (0.303) (0.033) (0.069) (0.067)
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology -0.3381 0.8617 -0.6227 0.6090
(CCE, years >16) (0.208) (0.065) (0.092) (0.092)
Food & Drug retailers -0.1005 0.9917 -0.6716 0.6873
(CCE, years >24) (0.088) (0.010) (0.062) (0.065)
General retailers 0.0271 0.9389 -0.5971 0.5781
(CCE, years >30) (0.078) (0.017) (0.052) (0.055)
Media 0.0324 0.9593 -0.6106 0.6266
(CCE, years >21) (0.212) (0.021) (0.047) (0.050)
Travel & leisure -0.1096 0.9342 -0.6237 0.6179
(CCE, years >32) (0.092) (0.020) (0.053) (0.049)
Gas, Water & Multiutilities -0.4865 1.1796 -0.4771 0.5823
(CCE, years >16) (0.453) (0.061) (0.182) (0.211)
Software & Computer Services -0.4625 0.9045 -0.7090 0.7031
(CCE, years >14) (0.314) (0.043) (0.063) (0.066)
Technology Hardware & Equipment -0.0600 0.8267 -0.7344 0.6972
(CCE, years >15) (0.379) (0.047) (0.107) (0.103)
7 Firm, sector, and common shocks
The use of cross-sectional averages to address cross-sectional dependence also provides
a potential source of extra information because we can interpret these cross-sectional
averages at the sectoral level as measures of sectoral disturbances. Suppose that rms
respond to a number of shocks. First, there is the response of the i-th rm to idiosyncratic
shocks both to demand and supply. Secondly there are responses to shocks at the level
of the industry/sector. Finally there are responses to aggregate economy wide shocks.
In the basic model (1) the long run dynamics were modelled solely in terms of a prot
margin equilibrium term:
LRmargin =  i (ln ci;t 1   i ln si;t 1) : (3)
Now, consider the more general long run model for a rm i in industry j (i 2 Ij):
LRj = 0iyt 1+1i ln ci;t 1+2i ln si;t 1+3i ln c
(j)
t 1+4i ln s
(j)
t 1; i = 1; Nj; i 2 Ij; t = 1; T;
(4)
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where the superscript (j) in c(j)t 1 and s
(j)
t 1 indicate that these are averages of the industry
j in which the i-th rm resides, and yt 1 is a (stationary) measure of the aggregate
economy wide shock in the previous year.
Including the cross-section averages, there are now 4 I(1) variables with temporal
variation, ln ci;t 1, ln si;t 1, ln c
(j)
t 1 and ln s
(j)
t 1. All four have time series variation, while
only two, ln ci;t 1 and ln si;t 1, have cross-sectional variation as well. There are up to
3 cointegrating relations between these variables, described below. This enriches our
specication of the long run equilibria and of the partial adjustment to these di¤erent
equilibria. We use the latent factor structure to include these potential long run equilib-
rium relationships in the model.
Prot margin equilibrium. The leading equilibrium relation, as before, is the prot
margin cointegration between log costs and log sales:
LRmargin =  i (ln ci;t 1   i ln si;t 1) : (5)
At the rm level, costs adjust to their long run equilibrium with sales, with i as the rate
of partial adjustment to the departure from equilibrium in the previous year, ln ci;t 1  
i ln si;t 1. Potentially the long run coe¢ cient i is heterogenous across rms, but as
discussed earlier is expected to have approximately unit value, i  1. For rms within
the same sector, the long run coe¢ cient may be homogeneous. Further, if i = 1 for
all rms within the sector, the average prot margin is approximately  E (i) =E (i),
where these two parameters (xed e¤ect and partial adjustment) are allowed to vary
across rms within a sector.
Market share equilibrium. The second equilibrium is a market share relation for sales,
where sales of each rm potentially maintain an equilibrium market share to total sales of
all rms in a sector.There are only 2 long run coe¢ cients connecting the sales and average
sales terms in (4), and each equilibrium relation requires identication of 2 parameters
(the partial adjustment and long run coe¢ cient). Now, since the coe¢ cient on sales
is xed by the prot margin equilibrium (5), these 2 long run coe¢ cients cannot be
separately identied.
However, two observations can be made. First, there is potentially a restriction that
would ensure identication. As discussed above, the long run e¤ect of sales on costs
is likely to be close to unity (i  1), even if the short run dynamic e¤ect suggests
operating leverage (i < 1). In fact, our empirical results show that this relation holds
approximately across all the sectors. Hence imposing this constraint would allow us
to identify the two long run coe¢ cients in the market share equilibrium. Nevertheless,
this is not satisfactory because it restricts the partial adjustment to both the above two
equilibria to be identical.
Second, there is also a third relation implied by our model. Since costs and sales
are linked together in equilibrium through (5), sales being related to total sales through
a hypothesized market share equilibrium suggests that costs of a rm are also similarly
related to total costs of all rms in the sector. Further, the partial adjustment and long
run e¤ect for both these equilibria should be exactly the same. Thus we have 4 long run
coe¢ cients (rm sales, rm costs, total sales and total costs) and 2 long run coe¢ cients
to be identied. The above two constraints ensure that the two parameters of the market
21
share equilibrium are exactly identied:
LRshare =  i

ln ci;t 1   i ln c(j)t 1

  i

ln si;t 1   i ln s(j)t 1

=  i
h
(ln ci;t 1 + ln si;t 1)  i

ln c
(j)
t 1 + ln s
(j)
t 1
i
: (6)
We call this cointegrating relationship the market share equilibrium.
The prot market equilibrium and the market share equilibrium involve only two
variables, hence the partial adjustment term and long run slope have to be identied,
and two other lagged I(1) variables included with heterogenous slopes in the short run
dynamic part of the model. The long run relations for these two equilibria are as follows:
LRj =   ( 0i) yt 1   ( 1i)

ln ci;t 1  

 2i
1i

ln si;t 1

(7)
+3i ln c
(j)
t 1 + 4i ln s
(j)
t 1
=   ( 0i) yt 1   ( 2i)

(ln ci;t 1 + ln si;t 1) 

 4i
2i

ln c
(j)
t 1 + ln s
(j)
t 1

+(1i   2i) ln ci;t 1 + (3i   4i) ln c(j)t 1 (8)
Under the margin equilibrium, the model is estimated using the mean group estimator,
setting the long run as (7) and including (9) in the short run dynamics. Assuming
homogeneity in the long run coe¢ cient i =  2i=1i = , the model is also estimated as
a pooled mean group model. We apply a Hausman test for the homogeneity assumption.
Estimation under the market share equilibrium is similar, in this case using (8) as the
long run specication; however, in this case, pooled mean group estimation is not used
because equilibrium market shares for di¤erent rms are expected to vary across rms.
Cycle equilibrium The third equilibrium is the potential partial adjustment of log
costs and log sales (and therefore prot margin) to the economic cycle represented by
LRcycle =  i yt 1. This equilibrium captures the e¤ect of an aggregate economy wide
shock. Even though this equilibrium relation does not exploit cross section variation,
it is important to allow for its potential inuence in some sectors. Identication of the
cycle equilibrium is straightforward, as it involves a distinct variable yt 1 and only one
parameter has to be identied from its coe¢ cient: the partial adjustment  i .
In addition, the model includes short run dynamics. The short-run rm-specic slope
coe¢ cient i captures the e¤ect of an unanticipated shock to sales, which as discussed
earlier, is our estimate of operating leverage. If a rm can pass any shock to sales
proportionately through to costs, i = 1, otherwise if pass-through is incomplete, i < 1.
Allowing for slope heterogeneity across rms, for each specic sector Ij, we testH0 : bj = 1
against the left-tailed alternative H1 : bj < 1, where bj = E (iji 2 Ij). If there is
operating leverage, that is, if the null hypothesis is rejected, we investigate potential
reasons for incomplete pass-through.
8 Determinants of operating leverage
There are several reasons why pass-through may be incomplete. The costs of employ-
ment or xed capital may be sticky. Alternatively, the rm may intend to make price
adjustments, rather than quantity adjustments, but nds that prices are sticky on the
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downside, leading to an asymmetric adjustment of costs to sales. To test these conjec-
tures, we model the short run e¤ect, i, as a function of employment (nit), the log of real
xed capital (kit), and an indicator that sales have positive growth over the previous year
(I ( ln sit > 0)). Thus, for sector Ij:
i = 0i + 1iI ( ln sit > 0) + 2ikit + 3init + 4ini;t+1; i 2 Ij: (9)
1i now measures the short run e¤ect of asymmetry and 2i measures the e¤ect of sticky
capital costs. Descriptive analysis of the data suggests that many rms adjust labour
with a lag, so 3i and 4i now capture the sticky costs associated with labour adjustment
in terms of contemporaneous and one-year ahead labour costs.
Combining (4) with (9) provides our estimation model. 0i captures residual operating
leverage e¤ects after controlling for these sources of operating leverage. We test residual
operating leverage as H0 : E (0i) = 1 versus H1 : E (0i) < 1. The asymmetry and sticky
capital channels are tested as H0 : E (1i) = 0 versus H1 : E (1i) < 0, and H0 : E (2i) =
0 versus H1 : E (2i) < 0 respectively, while the sticky labour explanation is tested as
H0 : E (3i) = E (4i) = 0 against the alternative H1 : min fE (3i) ; E (4i)g < 0.
Employment (nit) is measured by number of employees. We use a Hodrik Prescott
lter of quarterly output per capita averaged over the four quarters of every calendar
year as a measure of the business cycle (yt).6 Capital (kit) is measured as logarithm of
gross xed assets (in real terms), while sit and cit represent sales revenue and cost of
sales respectively, in real terms. The model is estimated separately for rms in each of 25
sectors.7 We draw inferences on average slopes across the cross-section using the mean
group estimator of the individual rm estimates and corresponding standard errors. If
the long run e¤ect is homogeneous across the rms (i = ) more e¢ cient inferences are
delivered by pooled mean group estimation. This means that while the individual short
run responses of shocks to sales are allowed to vary across rms, the long run relationship
between costs and sales are tested, and accordingly constrained, to be equal.
We estimate the full model using the pooled mean group (PMG) method and including
rm xed e¤ects, short run dynamics (9) and the long run margin specication (7) as
an unrestricted model. We also estimated restricted models omitting short run dynamics
and long run equilibria, retaining in each case the components of the base model (1). This
provides us with (pseudo) likelihood ratio tests for the joint signicance of our short run
and long run specications. Detailed results are not reported, but all sectors reject the
null hypothesis that our specication of short run dynamics and long run equilibria are
not signicant.8 We also estimate the full model as a mean group (MG), that is, without
the assumption that there is a homogeneous long run prot margin coe¢ cient for each
rm within the sector.
A Hausman test (Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978) is conducted to verify the validity of
the common long run e¤ect assumption underlying the PMG estimates. In 23 of the 25
sectors (except Industrial Metals and General Retailers), the null hypothesis of validity
of the PMG assumption cannot be rejected at the 5% signicance level. These results are
6Machin and van Reenen (1993) used unemployment rate as a measure of the business cycle. This
measure is based on the assumption of the unemployment rate is stationary, which is not true for the
long time period that our study covers.
7Using the Stata program xtpmg (Blackburne III and Frank, 2007).
8For the "Healthcare Equipment & Services" sector, pooled mean group estimation omitting short run
dynamics does not converge. This is likely due to an extremely at nature of the pseudo log-likelihood
surface. This we take as evidence of a rejection of the null hypothesis of no short run dynamics, beyond
i ln sit included our base model.
23
reported in Table 9 below.9 This provides conrmation that a homogeneous costs-sales
equilibrium relationship exists within most sectors.
Nonetheless the e¢ ciency gain from making the PMG assumption is not always sub-
stantial. Because of considerable attrition in the data, the estimation can only be con-
ducted over a limited sample of rms that have a substantial number of years of data,
which in turn leads to larger standard errors for the PMG estimates. This data issue
is considerably reduced for mean group estimation. Hence, our choice between PMG
and MG estimates is based on validity of the PMG assumption but also on sample size
considerations. Table 9 reports the chosen model for each of the 25 sectors, the minimum
number of years of data for sampled rms within the sector, together with the number
of rms and the number of rm-year observations in each case.
We also estimate a model using the market share specication of the long run equilib-
rium (8) using the mean group method only; this provides us with estimates of a partial
adjustment to the market share equilibrium. The pooled mean group assumption of a
common long run coe¢ cient is expected to be invalid in this case, since all rms within
a sector are not expected to have the same market share in equilibrium, and hence PMG
estimation is not conducted. Estimates of partial adjustment to the third (business) cycle
equilibrium are also obtained. Both the PMG and MG models provide evidence of this
equilibrium relationship only for a few sectors, indicating thereby that sectoral cycles
are often asynchronous with the aggregate business cycle. In e¤ect, the prot margin
equilibrium captures sector-specic cyclical activity in our context.
9In 3 other sectors Beverages, Leisure Goods and Technology Hardware & Equipment the null
hypothesis of homogenous long run prot margin coe¢ cient is rejected at the 10 percent level.
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Table 9: Estimates of long run coefficient on log-sales and partial adjustment terms
                                (coefficients on common correlated effects terms are not reported)
Log-sales Margin adj. Mkt.share adj. Cycle adj.
Oil & Gas Producers 36 467 -1.2705 1.0179 -0.5949 -0.4242 -0.8378
(pooled mean group, years >8) (0.961) (0.007) (0.229) (0.112) (1.028)
Chemicals 24 744 -0.0388 1.0049 -0.6401 -0.6524 0.1197
(pooled mean group, years >27) (0.112) (0.003) (0.128) (0.078) (0.126)
Forestry & Paper 16 307 -0.1689 1.0880 -0.4704 -0.5906 0.0338
(mean group, years >17) (0.136) (0.086) (0.136) (0.114) (0.132)
Industrial Metals 30 448 -0.2626 0.7598 -0.3485 -0.3137 -0.4187
(mean group, years >8) (0.443) (0.075) (0.195) (0.113) (0.208)
Construction & Materials 33 1103 -0.1465 0.9966 -0.5386 0.0199 -0.3703
(pooled mean group, years >31) (0.101) (0.004) (0.058) (0.423) (0.291)
Aerospace & Defense 16 401 -0.4300 1.0995 -0.8604 -0.6939 -0.0418
(mean group, years >13) (0.319) (0.092) (0.222) (0.169) (0.296)
General Industrials 19 565 -0.1266 1.0116 -0.5568 -0.6452 -0.1314
(pooled mean group, years >23) (0.056) (0.004) (0.083) (0.092) (0.127)
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 40 1043 -0.1369 0.9875 -0.3974 -0.6797 0.0132
(pooled mean group, years >21) (0.100) (0.005) (0.124) (0.077) (0.098)
Industrial Engineering 43 1319 0.1197 0.9869 -0.6021 -0.5964 0.0681
(mean group, years >31) (0.109) (0.027) (0.045) (0.046) (0.155)
Industrial Transportation 38 776 -0.0256 1.0152 -0.7396 -0.7129 -0.6395
(mean group, years >18) (0.098) (0.017) (0.137) (0.082) (0.399)
Support Services 32 1123 -0.1040 0.9912 -0.3897 0.0262 0.0540
(pooled mean group, years >32) (0.076) (0.001) (0.067) (0.576) (0.041)
Automobiles & Parts 9 267 0.1454 1.0205 -0.5840 -0.7257 0.1285
(pooled mean group, years >12) (0.154) (0.009) (0.142) (0.135) (0.097)
Beverages 28 761 -0.3719 0.5852 -0.4736 -0.4748 -0.2509
(mean group, years >19) (0.325) (0.292) (0.087) (0.086) (0.056)
Food Producers 40 941 -0.0604 1.0050 -0.6635 -0.7408 0.0123
(pooled mean group, years >19) (0.082) (0.001) (0.075) (0.075) (0.090)
Household Goods 7 263 -0.1178 1.0230 -0.3928 -0.4071 0.1820
(pooled mean group, years >36) (0.121) (0.014) (0.058) (0.069) (0.224)
Leisure Goods 10 198 0.1078 0.9930 -0.6047 3.1371 0.2044
(pooled mean group, years >14) (0.119) (0.013) (0.101) (3.506) (0.195)
Personal Goods 18 559 0.1988 1.0136 -0.6402 -0.6484 -0.2680
(pooled mean group, years >31) (0.148) (0.004) (0.105) (0.064) (0.271)
Health Care Equip. & Services 19 431 -0.2617 1.0408 -0.5839 -0.7988 -0.1305
(pooled mean group, years >17) (0.150) (0.006) (0.136) (0.131) (0.295)
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 21 361 0.3116 1.0122 -0.4821 -0.3160 1.1543
(mean group, years >11) (0.654) (0.323) (0.151) (0.111) (1.189)
Food & Drug Retailers 10 288 0.1426 0.8878 -0.6334 -0.6301 -0.1115
(mean group, years >24) (0.062) (0.099) (0.140) (0.141) (0.069)
General Retailers 29 898 -0.2299 0.9055 -0.6224 -0.5529 -0.0613
(mean group, years >30) (0.173) (0.056) (0.098) (0.061) (0.085)
Media 41 1013 -0.0708 1.0024 -0.5686 -0.6578 0.4366
(pooled mean group, years >21) (0.145) (0.002) (0.061) (0.066) (0.439)
Gas, Water & Multiutilities 11 179 0.1253 0.7735 -0.2564 -1.6307 1.1015
(pooled mean group, years >15) (0.294) (0.000) (0.111) (0.886) (6.842)
Software & Computer Services 30 583 -0.1941 1.0249 -0.7663 -0.8704 1.4897
(pooled mean group, years >16) (0.186) (0.001) (0.127) (0.129) (0.794)
Technology Hardware & Equipment 27 402 0.3267 0.1684 -0.8777 -0.6939 11.4419
(mean group, years >8) (0.629) (0.535) (0.227) (0.204) (11.162)
estimates (p -values in parentheses)
Bold (Italics ): Significant at 5% (10%)
Long-run - Margin, Mkt. share & Cycle eqbm.Sector No. of
firms
Firm-
years
Constant
Finally, we estimate two restricted models. First, we exclude the latent factor struc-
ture (common correlated e¤ects and lagged business cycle). Second, we use only the
base model (1). A comparison of estimates of the coe¢ cient on sales growth from the
short run dynamics for the full model, with those from the restricted models, allows some
inferences about the operating leverage hypothesis.
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Specically, we examine:
(a) how large the operating leverage e¤ect would appear to be if we considered partial
adjustment only to the prot margin equilibrium and we ignored spatial strong
dependence;
(b) how much is explained by the two other potential equilibria and corresponding
latent factors; and
(c) how much is explained by sticky labour costs, sticky capital and asymmetric price
adjustments.
Finally, we conduct cross section dependence (CD) tests (Pesaran, 2013) on the resid-
uals of our model to ensure that our specication of latent factors and equilibria has
mitigated issues relating to strong dependence; these tests are not reported, but are
available on request.
8.1 Long run equilibria
Table 9 reports estimates of the long run coe¢ cient on lagged (log) sales (prot margin
equilibrium) together with partial adjustment to the three potential equilibrium relation-
ships investigated here. There is substantial evidence of cointegration, supporting the
existence of a long run prot margin equilibrium relationship between log costs and log
sales. The partial adjustment to this equilibrium shows substantial variation across the
sectors, and is statistically signicant at the 5% level in 24 out of 25 sectors, and the 10%
level in the remaining sector, Industrial Metals. Correspondingly, the long run e¤ect of
sales on costs is numerically close to i = 1 in 21 sectors out of 25. Partial adjustment to
this equilibrium is slow in Industrial Metals and Gas, and Water & Multiutilities ( 0:35
and  0:26 respectively). In Technology Hardware & Equipment there is strong partial
adjustment ( 0:88), but e¤ectively to a xed cost equilibrium.
There is evidence (signicant at the 5% level) of a long run market share equilibrium
in 21 out of 25 sectors. By contrast, the data suggest that in Construction & Materials,
Support Services, and Leisure Goods, perhaps because competition is so severe that
market shares of rms are continuously updated and do not uctuate around rm specic
equilibrium levels.
There is little evidence of a partial adjustment to the economic cycle equilibrium,
which was the central focus of investigation in Machin and van Reenen (1993). Only
Industrial Metals and Beverages show signicant (at the 5% level) evidence of partial ad-
justment to the business cycle, and Industrial Transportation and Food & Drug Retailers
show weak evidence signicant at the 10% level.
There are two ways to interpret these results. From an econometric point of view,
latent factors account for most of the strong dependence in the data, and are in turn
modeled using common correlated e¤ects. Hence, a measured factor such as the business
cycle may consequently show considerably less importance. From an industrial economics
point of view, sectoral cycles in the UK are often claimed to be largely asynchronous so
that an aggregate economic cycle may not appropriately capture cyclical patterns at the
industry level. The results are consistent with this inetrpretation.
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Table 10: Estimates of short run effects of sales growth and operating leverage explanations
             (also growth coefficients in restricted models, excl. leverage explanations, and excl. factor structure as well)
Growth x Positive x Capital x Employment x Empl. (t+1)
Oil & Gas Producers 0.6355 0.5603 -0.0846 -0.2654 0.0170 0.8219 0.9796
(pooled mean group, years >8) (0.184) (0.339) (0.282) (0.130) (0.146) (0.062) (0.038)
Chemicals 0.9241 0.0255 0.0250 -0.1420 -0.2331 0.9849 0.9909
(pooled mean group, years >27) (0.067) (0.071) (0.109) (0.145) (0.107) (0.014) (0.011)
Forestry & Paper 1.0690 -0.1224 0.2753 0.7965 0.5244 0.9310 1.0066
(mean group, years >17) (0.082) (0.085) (0.116) (0.389) (0.321) (0.032) (0.066)
Industrial Metals 0.9045 0.1056 0.3774 -0.6460 0.3082 0.9153 0.9264
(mean group, years >8) (0.087) (0.097) (0.242) (0.503) (0.114) (0.017) (0.021)
Construction & Materials 0.9806 0.0069 0.0564 -0.1067 0.1262 0.9679 0.9710
(pooled mean group, years >31) (0.025) (0.028) (0.068) (0.078) (0.091) (0.011) (0.011)
Aerospace & Defense 1.0238 -0.0811 0.6017 0.5638 -0.2567 0.9799 0.9850
(mean group, years >13) (0.130) (0.179) (0.592) (0.613) (0.185) (0.023) (0.022)
General Industrials 0.9776 -0.0256 -0.1655 0.2958 0.0454 0.9684 0.9619
(pooled mean group, years >23) (0.056) (0.095) (0.120) (0.203) (0.098) (0.015) (0.017)
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 1.0312 -0.1179 0.1503 0.5427 0.9565 0.9525
(pooled mean group, years >21) (0.038) (0.055) (0.113) (0.339) (0.024) (0.023)
Industrial Engineering 0.8631 0.1628 -0.0507 -0.1590 0.0763 0.9548 0.9566
(mean group, years >31) (0.058) (0.120) (0.094) (0.120) (0.049) (0.019) (0.021)
Industrial Transportation 0.8486 0.0816 -0.2735 0.1775 0.0503 0.9751 0.9119
(mean group, years >18) (0.123) (0.189) (0.179) (0.535) (0.151) (0.050) (0.100)
Support Services 0.9833 -0.0407 0.0645 0.0498 0.9789 0.9849
(pooled mean group, years >32) (0.021) (0.037) (0.046) (0.075) (0.012) (0.012)
Automobiles & Parts 1.0420 -0.1217 0.0983 0.3710 -0.0199 0.9236 0.9314
(pooled mean group, years >12) (0.060) (0.076) (0.181) (0.104) (0.083) (0.035) (0.041)
Beverages 1.0172 -0.0479 -0.0504 0.3554 -0.0064 1.0748 1.0704
(mean group, years >19) (0.057) (0.067) (0.088) (0.351) (0.086) (0.080) (0.012)
Food Producers 1.0891 -0.1142 -0.0057 0.1310 0.1526 0.9967 0.9966
(pooled mean group, years >19) (0.065) (0.069) (0.071) (0.094) (0.087) (0.008) (0.013)
Household Goods 0.9350 0.0470 0.1551 -0.2325 -0.0049 0.9182 0.9176
(pooled mean group, years >36) (0.076) (0.080) (0.052) (0.068) (0.039) (0.039) (0.036)
Leisure Goods 0.8625 0.1001 -0.1077 -0.0772 0.0634 0.8867 0.8972
(pooled mean group, years >14) (0.061) (0.060) (0.249) (0.131) (0.068) (0.029) (0.041)
Personal Goods 0.9057 0.0595 0.0255 -0.1587 0.0965 0.9709 0.9651
(pooled mean group, years >31) (0.035) (0.058) (0.073) (0.169) (0.075) (0.014) (0.015)
Health Care Equip. & Services 1.1980 -0.3581 0.0332 0.1800 -0.1185 0.7644 0.7735
(pooled mean group, years >17) (0.246) (0.279) (0.231) (0.263) (0.261) (0.053) (0.072)
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 0.3700 0.1916 1.3560 -3.6183 0.3018 0.8450 0.9367
(mean group, years >11) (0.539) (0.467) (1.179) (3.563) (0.164) (0.069) (0.063)
Food & Drug Retailers -6.4881 7.3715 0.0012 0.0194 -0.0919 0.9844 0.9770
(mean group, years >24) (7.422) (7.422) (0.140) (0.077) (0.073) (0.020) (0.020)
General Retailers 0.9233 0.1013 0.0213 0.0713 0.0291 1.0523 0.9795
(mean group, years >30) (0.045) (0.112) (0.070) (0.050) (0.115) (0.110) (0.010)
Media 0.9466 0.0657 0.0161 -0.0105 -0.1377 0.9552 0.9467
(pooled mean group, years >21) (0.074) (0.095) (0.132) (0.196) (0.117) (0.017) (0.019)
Gas, Water & Multiutilities 1.0622 0.5196 -2.4321 0.1621 0.4086 1.0172 1.0917
(pooled mean group, years >15) (0.430) (0.730) (2.899) (0.918) (0.568) (0.069) (0.118)
Software & Computer Services 1.1066 -0.3539 0.0830 0.4925 0.5283 0.8566 0.8588
(pooled mean group, years >16) (0.213) (0.339) (0.184) (0.427) (0.331) (0.040) (0.051)
Technology Hardware & Equipment 0.6380 -0.3000 0.4666 -0.9848 3.3236 0.7797 0.8207
(mean group, years >8) (0.121) (0.400) (0.328) (0.532) (3.378) (0.062) (0.064)
estimates (p -values in parentheses)
Bold (Italics ): Significant at 5% (10%)
LR + Only
growth
Sector Short-run - Sales growth & operating lev. Explanations Growth plus
factors
8.2 Short run dynamics
The principal subject of study in this paper is operating leverage, that is, the question
of whether, and by how much, the coe¢ cient on sales growth in short run dynamics falls
below unity, and to what extent this can be explained by asymmetric price adjustments,
and by sticky labour and capital costs. Table 10 reports the estimates of the short
run dynamics. In the full model the estimated short run coe¢ cient on sales growth
is below unity in 16 of the 25 sectors, but this is statistically signicantly in only 5
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sectors: Personal Goods, Industrial Engineering, Leisure Goods, Oil & Gas Producers,
and General Retailers.
However, estimates of the base model without latent factors and explanatory interac-
tion variables reveal a strikingly di¤erent story. The coe¢ cient is less that unity in all
but three sectors Beverages, General Retailers and Gas, Water & Multiutilities and
signicantly so in 17 sectors.
A partial explanation comes from the use of long run latent factors and partial ad-
justment to di¤erent equilibria. When these common correlated e¤ects and the economic
cycle are adjusted for, the coe¢ cient is lower than unity for 22 of the 25 sectors and
this is statistically signicant in 14. Mostly, this explanation comes from sticky employ-
ment, but also in some sectors from xed capital costs and asymmetric price adjustments.
The combined e¤ect of asymmetric price adjustment and sticky labour and xed capital
explains operating leverage fully in 9 of these 14 sectors,10 including some of the most im-
portant sectors in the UK economy. However, these inferences are more clearly apparent
in statistical tests.
Table 11 presents left-tailed tests of statistical hypotheses for operating leverage.
Based on estimates of the base model (1), there is a statistically signicantly (at 5%
signicance level) evidence of margin contraction due to an unexpected shock to sales,
in 17 out of 25 sectors. However, in the base model there is partial adjustment only
to one cointegrating relationship, the log cost and log sales prot margin equilibrium.
This model is probably too simplistic. We nd evidence that in certain sectors costs and
sales may also adjust to market share and economic cycle equilibria. Presumably, rms
would anticipate partial adjustment to multiple equilibria in these sectors so that the
unanticipated component in sales growth may be lower, and therefore also the operating
leverage channel.
This turns out to be the case in most (11 out of 17) of the sectors where margin
shrink is signicantly lower after accounting for the other equilibrium relationships.11
Nevertheless, the operating leverage e¤ect is still statistically signicant in 14 sectors.
In all but 5 of the sectors (Oil & Gas Producers, Industrial Engineering, Leisure Goods,
Personal Goods and General Retailers) explanatory interaction variables fully explain
operating leverage up to the point where it is no longer statistically signicant. In the
main, the explanation comes from sticky labour costs. This consistent with a world where
frictions in the labour market ensure that, faced with an unanticipated fall in sales, rms
choose not to, or may not be able to, fully adjust their employment.
Our descriptive analysis suggests that employment is partly adjusted in the following
year and we allow for delayed adjustment in the estimated model. The sticky labour
costs explanation is statistically signicant in 9 sectors.12 In addition, sticky xed capital
is also signicant, at the 10% level, in 2 other sectors, General Industrials and Industrial
Transportation. So, in total, there are 11 sectors where sticky costs explain operating
leverage e¤ects.
10Industrial Metals, Construction & Materials, General Industrials, Electronic & Electrical Equip-
ment, Automobiles & Parts, Household Goods, Media, Software & Computer Services and Technology
Hardware & Equipment.
11Oil & Gas Producers, Forestry & Paper, Industrial Metals, Construction & Materials, Industrial
Engineering, Support Services, Automobiles & Parts, Leisure Goods, Healthcare Equipment & Services,
Software & Computer Services and Technology Hardware & Equipment.
12At the 5 percent level in 4 sectors - Oil & Gas Producers, Chemicals, Household Goods and Tech-
nology Hardware & Equipment, and at 10 percent in 5 other sectors - Industrial Metals, Construction
& Materials, Aerospace & Defence, Industrial Engineering and Food & Drug Retailers.
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Table 11: (Left-tailed) tests for operating leverage and its explanations
Only growth Incl. factors All variables Sticky capital Sticky employment Asymmetry
Oil & Gas Producers 2.8746 0.5326 1.9795 0.3001 2.0407 -1.6551
(pooled mean group, years >8) (0.002) (0.297) (0.024) (0.382) (0.021) (0.951)
Chemicals 1.1206 0.7980 1.1408 -0.2286 2.1844 -0.3608
(pooled mean group, years >27) (0.131) (0.212) (0.127) (0.590) (0.014) (0.641)
Forestry & Paper 2.1661 -0.1007 -0.8400 -2.3820 -1.6321 1.4367
(mean group, years >17) (0.015) (0.540) (0.800) (0.991) (0.949) (0.075)
Industrial Metals 5.0398 3.4266 1.1035 -1.5620 1.2852 -1.0937
(mean group, years >8) (0.000) (0.000) (0.135) (0.941) (0.099) (0.863)
Construction & Materials 3.0201 2.7282 0.7777 -0.8329 1.3709 -0.2493
(pooled mean group, years >31) (0.001) (0.003) (0.218) (0.798) (0.085) (0.598)
Aerospace & Defense 0.8930 0.6780 -0.1836 -1.0161 1.3860 0.4525
(mean group, years >13) (0.186) (0.249) (0.573) (0.845) (0.083) (0.325)
General Industrials 2.0559 2.2674 0.3983 1.3792 -0.4638 0.2711
(pooled mean group, years >23) (0.020) (0.012) (0.345) (0.084) (0.679) (0.393)
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 1.7953 2.0648 -0.8240 -1.3290 -1.6024 2.1355
(pooled mean group, years >21) (0.036) (0.019) (0.795) (0.908) (0.945) (0.016)
Industrial Engineering 2.4420 2.0823 2.3670 0.5399 1.3268 -1.3538
(mean group, years >31) (0.007) (0.019) (0.009) (0.295) (0.092) (0.912)
Industrial Transportation 0.4974 0.8768 1.2272 1.5247 -0.3317 -0.4323
(mean group, years >18) (0.309) (0.190) (0.110) (0.064) (0.630) (0.667)
Support Services 1.7187 1.2813 0.8089 -1.4091 -0.6609 1.1136
(pooled mean group, years >32) (0.043) (0.100) (0.209) (0.921) (0.746) (0.133)
Automobiles & Parts 2.1555 1.6888 -0.7046 -0.5414 0.2396 1.5905
(pooled mean group, years >12) (0.016) (0.046) (0.759) (0.706) (0.405) (0.056)
Beverages -0.9389 -5.6549 -0.3037 0.5754 0.0742 0.7198
(mean group, years >19) (0.826) (1.000) (0.619) (0.283) (0.470) (0.236)
Food Producers 0.3920 0.2671 -1.3616 0.0805 -1.3987 1.6456
(pooled mean group, years >19) (0.348) (0.395) (0.913) (0.468) (0.919) (0.050)
Household Goods 2.1052 2.2594 0.8547 -2.9752 3.4075 -0.5887
(pooled mean group, years >36) (0.018) (0.012) (0.196) (0.999) (0.000) (0.722)
Leisure Goods 3.9306 2.5350 2.2569 0.4333 0.5886 -1.6766
(pooled mean group, years >14) (0.000) (0.006) (0.012) (0.332) (0.278) (0.953)
Personal Goods 2.1377 2.3450 2.6856 -0.3510 0.9370 -1.0258
(pooled mean group, years >31) (0.016) (0.010) (0.004) (0.637) (0.174) (0.848)
Health Care Equip. & Services 4.4063 3.1286 -0.8038 -0.1436 0.4538 1.2836
(pooled mean group, years >17) (0.000) (0.001) (0.789) (0.557) (0.325) (0.100)
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 2.2522 1.0052 1.1687 -1.1496 1.0155 -0.4104
(mean group, years >11) (0.012) (0.157) (0.121) (0.875) (0.155) (0.659)
Food & Drug Retailers 0.7760 1.1305 1.0089 -0.0083 1.2653 -0.9931
(mean group, years >24) (0.219) (0.129) (0.157) (0.503) (0.100) (0.840)
General Retailers -0.4775 2.0691 1.7206 -0.3044 -0.2533 -0.9059
(mean group, years >30) (0.683) (0.019) (0.043) (0.620) (0.600) (0.818)
Media 2.6113 2.8486 0.7200 -0.1220 1.1753 -0.6951
(pooled mean group, years >21) (0.005) (0.002) (0.236) (0.549) (0.120) (0.756)
Gas, Water & Multiutilities -0.2499 -0.7785 -0.1447 0.8390 -0.1766 -0.7119
(pooled mean group, years >15) (0.599) (0.782) (0.558) (0.201) (0.570) (0.762)
Software & Computer Services 3.5994 2.7469 -0.4998 -0.4510 -1.1529 1.0444
(pooled mean group, years >16) (0.000) (0.003) (0.691) (0.674) (0.876) (0.148)
Technology Hardware & Equipment 3.5544 2.8164 2.9876 -1.4209 1.8518 0.7503
(mean group, years >8) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.922) (0.032) (0.227)
z -stats (p -values in parentheses)
Bold (Italics ): Significant at 5% (10%)
Explanations for operating leverageTest for operating leverage (lower margin)Sector
There are 4 other sectors where asymmetric price adjustments provide an explanation;
the e¤ect is statistically signicant at the 5% level in 2 sectors (Electronic & Electrical
Equipment and Food Producers) and at the 10% level in 2 others (Forestry & Paper
and Automobiles & Parts). We conjecture that the forces of domestic and international
competition restrict producers in these sectors from being able to adjust prices fully on
the downside.
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9 Conclusions
In this paper we have sought to operationalise the analysis of operating leverage in a
model in which we allow for short run variations in margin but test and control for an
equilibrating relationship for margins in the long run. To do this we use some recent
developments in panel econometrics which allows for heterogeneity in slopes and the
possibility of common factors. We found that aggregate models using data for all sectors
failed to make full allowance for cross sectional dependence, and failed to adequately
capture sectoral variation in operating leverage and its explanations. We examine how
operating leverage functions in 25 UK sectors. Our results suggest that the behaviour of
operating leverage over the business cycle reects sticky labour costs and some degree of
asymmetric price adjustment. But we also nd that there are two main equibrating long
run relationships to which operating prot adjusts the relationship between costs and
sales and a market share relationship between rm sales and total sales in a sector.
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